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CONFLICTING IDEALS FOR REORGANIZATION
ROGER S. FOSTERt
M OST of the recent literature dealing with reorganization and the
reorganization amendments to the Bankruptcy Act has emphasized
reorganization procedure, and properly so.' Abuses conceived to have
existed in the past have been primarily procedural. The general tenor
of reform objective has been to shift control over reorganization from
investment bankers to the security holders themselves or to public
authority.
In reorganizations the banker has managed the financial body politic
much as machine organizations have managed municipal politics.2 There
has been more suavity and unction and much less scandal, but the
essential sources of power and of weakness have been alike. Like
Tammany, the wise bankers have adapted their government to the more
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Equity vs. Bankruptcy (1933) 17 Mnm. L. RzV.
237-269; Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations (1934) 47 Mn. xv. L.
REv. 565; Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganization Act (1934) 43 Hmnv.
L. REv. 39; Kahn, The New Corporate Reorgani:ation Statute (1935) 1 C.on=n RE-
ORGA.TZArOizS 254; Kaplan, Corporate Reorganization Under Section 77B of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1934) 33 Mici. L. REv. 77; Lisman, Protective Committees For Security
Holders (1934) 13 H Av. Bus. REv. 19; Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act (1933)
47 Hamv. L. Rav. 18; Rodgers & Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 Co.. L. Rrv. 571; Sabel, The CorPcrate
Reorganizations Act (1934) 19 Min. L. Rry. 34; Spaeth, The Reorganization Amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 8 Tanrx L. Q. 447; Swain; Corporate Reorgaizalibr-
An Amendraent to the Bankruptcy Act-A Symposium (1933) 19 VA. L. Ray. 317; Weier,
Corporate Reorganization: Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 34 Cor. L. R-y.
1173; Weinstein, On the Meaning and Implications of "Affected" Under Section 77B (1934)
1 Co poRATE RaoRGANZTioxns 183.
For recent discussion of substantive limitations on the scope of reorgani-tion plans see
Douglas and Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganization (1933) 42 Y= L. J. 1c03;
Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Rcorgar.izatiors (1933)
19 VA. L. Ray. 541; Gerdes, A Fair and Equitable Plan of Corporate Reorganization Under
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1; Payne, Fair and
Equitable Plans of Corporate Reorganization (1934) 20 VA. L. Rxv. 37.
2. The analogy is more apt to city than to national government because in financial
politics there are fairly well defined and respected spheres of influence. There is nothing
akin to a two party system.
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permanent tendencies of human nature, rather than those moral ab-
stractions that sometimes get written into law. They have managed
to dispense patronage and warp the application of principles with a
view to appeasing aggressive, articulate and influential constituents.
The timid souls, the guileless and confiding masses, have been forgotten
men.
Let us assume that recent procedural changes have inaugurated a "new
deal"; that the bankers have been exposed as corrupt. In their efforts
to get and retain power they may have overplayed their hands. Their
concessions to expediency having been played up dramatically against
the popular ideal of impartiality, a moral revulsion has resulted
-if not among their immediate constituents in the financial com-
munity, at least among the wider public opinion which impinges upon
governmental bodies, courts and legislatures. The upheaval which fol-
lowed the exposure has put reform in the saddle. The reformer is expected
to substitute an honest, i. e., a rational government of laws and not of
men-for its corrupt predecessor.
Every reformer's problem is two-fold. He must keep alive the moral
fervor for honesty, lest the forces which gave him power disintegrate
into a general scramble for special privilege. He must also have a simple
and understandable standard of what is righteous, upon which his fol-
lowers are agreed." Otherwise corrupt desire for self-aggrandizement
will creep in under cover of alternative theories of what is right. Some
of those who voted the reformers in will subsequently favor one theory
and some another, according as their own self-interest will be affected.
It is not altogether clear how sweeping has been the reformer's vic-
tory in the recent changes in reorganization practice. Something equiva-
lent to a new constitution has been established for that important segment
of our economic affairs which is governed by the reorganization process.
That constitution is to be found in the two latest decisions of the Supreme
Court dealing with reorganization4 and in Sections 77 and 77B of the
3. A perhaps apocryphal story quotes President Roosevelt as saying to one of his
so-called "liberal" advisers, "One reason why the conservatives always have their way is
that they don't want anything done and are all agreed upon it. You liberals all want
something done but no two of you can agree what it is."
4. "Every important determination by the court in receivership proceedings calls for
an informed, independent judgment." National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426, 436
(1933). "Moreover the court stood in a position different from that which It occupies
in ordinary litigation, where issues are to be determined solely upon such evidence as the
contending parties choose to introduce." First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem,
290 U. S. 504, 525 (1934). There was no intrinsic novelty in the insistence that a
receivership judge should be more than a yes-man for directing bankers. These decisions
merely gave new emphasis and more specific direction to what had been said before. See
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville and C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674, 688 (1899): ".. . a court
assuming in foreclosure proceedings the charge of railroad property by a receiver can
never rightfully become the mere silent registrar of agreements of mortgagee and mortgagor."
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Bankruptcy Act. It seems to require the judges of the lower federal
courts to take more of a hand than heretofore in shaping the reorgan-
ization process.5 They must give their approval to plans as fair and
equitable. To many this would seem to imply that somewhere in the
law books are to be found rational standards of fairness which will
enable the reorganization judge to determine the fairness of the plan
with reference to factors other than the loudness of the clamor and
the vigorousness of the insistence upon special advantages of those in-
terested in the various securities to be reorganized.
This article attempts to explore the precedents to which the reorgan-
ization judge must resort. The effort will be to ascertain whether they
indicate any rational standards for appraising the fairness of a re-
organization plan. The reform movement has drafted the reorganization
judge out of his cloistered obscurity, out of his position of detachment
from really vital economic issues, simply because of the general con-
fidence in his integrity. It is only fair that someone should try to tell
him what is expected of him. Is the answer to be found in the books
of the law? If no rational substantive principle can be found, it may
be that the objective of procedural reform has been misdirected.
LowER COURT PRACTICE CONTRASTED WITH SUPREME CouRT
DECISIONS AS EVIDENCE OF REORGANIZATION LAW
Reorganization has supplanted liquidation as the normal consequence
of the failure of large corporations. It is offered as an alternative to
the sacrifice of going concern values which usually far exceed liquida-
tion values. Yet creditors' and even preferred stockholders' rights are
normally conceived of as rights and priorities in liquidation. This is
both the abstract legal conception, and the natural implication of the
financial documents and sales literature whether used to obtain mer-
cantile credit or to sell securities with liens and preferential rights. The
expectations of priority are created both with reference to what may
be realized in the event of corporate failure and as sanctions to minimize
the risks of failure. The promoters and managers identified with the
junior stock are to be kept from rash solicitation or use of capital by
the fear that whatever losses occur must first wipe out their own invest-
ment stake. In supplanting liquidation as the corporate day of judg-
5. For a review of the traditional hesitancy of receivership judges to take any part in
shaping reorganization plans, see Sunderland, Historical Bachground of the Corporate Barh-
ruptcy Reorganization Act (1934) 1 CompoRaT RroaG;ANAno:,s 4, 13. Both ideas of
reform and the desires of the reorganization bar to improve the efficiency of their tech-
niques seem to have found expression in the Act. Those actively engaged in reorganization
work would not be so much interested in enhancing the reorganization judge's power to
curb their own activities, as in using the assumption that the judge would pass upon the
fairness of the plan as a justification for removing other restraints.
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ment, reorganization must offer equivalent opportunity for realization
of these rights and expectations of priority-yet the attempt to insist
on strict enforcement of priorities usually interferes with the conserva-
tion of going concern values. The incompatibility of these two desirable
objectives gives rise to conflicting ethical attitudes and ideals-one puni-
tive and the other practical. These ideals manifest respectively the basic
human passions of vengeance and avarice. Each ideal has had its own
typical champions.
The bankers, leading metropolitan lawyers, and judges whose task it
is to get reorganization done have unreservedly and consistently cham-
pioned the practical ideal. They emphasize the desirability of getting
the company back on its feet as expeditiously and inexpensively as pos-
sible, and to this end suggest letting bygones be bygones, lest bickerings
and recriminations convert partial into total loss.'
The Supreme Court has been the distinguished champion of the puni-
tive ideal, but with much division among the justices and some vacilla-
tion in the extent of the concessions it has been willing to make to the
practical point of view. Its position as a court of last but only occa-
sional appeal prevents it from sharing in the contemporaneous shaping
of reorganization plans. This has both relieved it from the immediate
pressure of practical exigencies when announcing its views, and tended
to prevent its views from being followed in practice when they seemed
to stand in the way of what the practical reorganizers considered neces-
sary to get reorganization done.
The two ideals have come to grips primarily over the treatment of
stockholders. A convenient epitome of the Supreme Court's attitude is
found in an oft-quoted exerpt from the Monon case:
"Any arrangement... by which the subordinate rights and interests of tho
stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of
either class of creditors" (secured or unsecured) "comes within judicial
denunciation." 7
The reorganizations with which this article is concerned presuppose a
6. The same clash of ideals arises over the administration of the property pending
reorganization. From the punitive point of view it seems highly desirable to have a
vigorous investigation to see if misconduct of the old management has caused the disaster.
Where, however, the impact of changed business conditions upon the financial structure of
the company is of itself sufficient explanation, those who usually dominate the reorganiza-
tion machinery will endeavor to stifle inquiry. They wish to enlist the cooperation of
those most familiar with the business; they fear that the cost of investigation will be out
of proportion to possible recovery. There is also a certain feeling that busines executives
should not submit to trial as to their handling of complex situations except by a jury of
their peers. For protest against the usual practice see Lowenthal, supra note 1, at 18, 24.
7. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674, 684 (1899), quoted In
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 505 (1913); Kansas City Ry. Co. v.
Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445, 454 (1926).
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shrinkage, at least in present realizable values, below the aggregate of
creditors' claims. In such cases, strict enforcement of priorities would
wipe out the stock. The incidental advantage according to the punitive
point of view would be to teach a lesson to the promoters and managers
identified with the stock interests,8 and the bankers who, whether or not
previously identified with the stock, seem to display a perverse desire
to favor it in reorganization. The champions of the practical ideal
recognize the pre-eminent strategic position of those identified with the
stock, in view of their opportunity for sabotage and obstruction if not
appeased and for positive co-operation if given sufficient inducement.
They often favor liberal treatment of the stock.
The lack of sympathy between the Supreme Court and the leaders
of the reorganization bar has been notorious. They have not been hum-
ble in accepting rebuke from the venerated Court. Convinced of the
rectitude of their own practices, they have raged against the Court,
delivered lectures to expose its folly,9 and contrived subtly to refashion
the patterns of reorganization so as to subvert the substance while seem-
ing to comply with the letter of its admonitions. Thanks to the tolerance,
if not actual sympathy of receivership judges, as well as to the con-
cessions the Supreme Court itself has made to the practical point of
view, they have by and large prevailed. The decisions of the Supreme
Court may fall like thunderbolts from Almighty Jove. There is a blind-
ing flash, perhaps some spectacular damage to a restricted area. Tempor-
arily there is terror and repentance. But soon calm is resumed and
with it confidence that, granted a proper observance of prescribed rituals
8. The Supreme Court opinions have imposed restrictions on the power of reorganizers
to offer participation to any stockholders without suggesting distinctions according to
whether their stock is preferred or common, voting or nonvoting, or whether the individual
stockholders are "lambs" or "wolves." For the moment we are only concerned with the
concept stockholders, as an ethical abstraction representing the villain of the corporate
history. To show the power which this abstraction may exercise over the policy judg-
ments that shape reorganization law, we must explore the way flesh and blood -villains
can use the power inherent in stock ownership to perpetrate villainy. Of course it dcee
not follow that curbing stockholders' rights in reorganization will necessarily inflict the
desired punishment on the flesh and blood villains. The question as to whether preferred
stockholders are entitled to better treatment than common stockholders will b considered
in a future article.
9. See especially JoL n, RAILWAY REoRcANImZnozs (an address before the Maryland
State Bar Association, July 26, 1900), and TAE METmoD jam Co.mucr oi, TnE Rxonm,7-
izATio oF CoRaoATioNs (lectures delivered before the Harvard Business School, April
4th and 6th, 1910). The general outline of Joline's lectures is followed and a similar
attitude reflected in Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations in Somm Lmz PRv-zss
or CORPORATE FhzANcmIG, REORG.IZATiON AND REGrXAur ,; (1917) 153. In bringing his
predecessors' lectures down to date, Swaine substitutes for their bold frontal attack upon
the Supreme Court's views a more subtle attempt to restate them as not really thwarting
the practical conduct of a reorganization. Reorganization of Corporations; Certain Derd-
opments of the Last Decade in id. (ed. of 1930).
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and occasional adaptation of their form to the whims of an angry god,
there is likely to be very little interference with the actual plans of
those who walk the earth below.
A temptingly simple explanation of why the practical reorganizer has
always scorned the ideals expressed by the Supreme Court, is that the
practical reorganizer is a wicked manipulator, who by corruption of
counsel, misleading suggestions and threats of forfeiture, obtains the
support of the vast majority of all classes of security holders for some
unfair plan, and thereby puts it over on a hand-picked receivership
judge who is too dull to see through the semblance of unanimity or too
weak to risk the responsibility of running the reorganization himself.10
No doubt the subservience of receivership judges to practical considera-
tions is due partly to the reorganizer's ability to maneuver the proceed-
ing before the most acceptable of several possible judges, his opportuni-
ties for ex parte insinuation before hostile interests can become articulate,
and his ability by pressure and use of patronage to dominate supposedly
independent receivers, trustees and committee men. But it is easy to
exaggerate the 'extent to which reorganization judges are actually de-
ceived by the conventional reorganization fictions, and the degree to
which they may differ in perspicacity from the Supreme Court justices
who have been so impatient with these same fictions. It is much more
plausible to attribute their different outlooks to the different roles played
by lower court and appellate judges in reorganization.
Allowance must be made for the difference in the pressure of practical
considerations while reorganization is still in progress and after it has
been completed. With those whose investments are still in jeopardy,
avarice proves a far more compelling motive than vengeance. Bond-
holders will acquiesce in a plan that seems unfairly preferential to stock-
holders if compromise on this basis seems to involve the greatest chance
of minimizing their loss. They will surrender unlimited powers over
their investments to banker-sponsored committees, despite feelings of
grievance against the bankers. Very few are so stubborn and vindictive
as to be willing to fight for principles without regard to cost. Usually
there are some shrewd enough to see the bargaining power of a small
minority obstructing the general desire to compromise. These may pre-
tend that they are fighting to assert their rights against unfair demands
of stockholders or corrupt manipulations of bankers, but their avarice
is thinly disguised. Invocation of punitive ideals by knights errant of
the bar, who purchase securities for their hold-up value, may also be
10. The best expression of this point of view is by Max Lowenthal in various articles
and in his book Tnx INVESTOR PAYS (1933). The mixture of admiration and skepticism
which the writer feels for Lowenthal's interpretation has been set forth in a review In
(1933) 43 YALE L. J. 352. See also Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorgan-
izations (1934) 47 HARv. L. R-v. 565.
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set down to avarice. Those wishing to compromise feel toward these
antagonists much as union laborers do toward "scabs." When stock-
holders use their strategic position to obstruct as a basis for getting
better terms than they are theoretically entitled to, it is not considered
blackmail. The term is reserved for the dissenters and knights errant.
Thus those who champion the punitive ideal before the reorganization
judge are made to appear far more loathsome than the stockholders
against whom it is directed. Moreover, the stockholders of a large
corporation include many unsophisticated investors, "widows and or-
phans" who have had nothing to do with the past promotion and man-
agement.11  It seems cruel to wipe them out. Many of the actual
promoters and those close to the management may have unloaded.
Inevitably the reorganization judge sympathizes with those who want
to compromise. Day to day concern for the practical problems of run-
ning the business and impatience to get it off his hands tend to cool
whatever punitive passions he may initially feel. He may even try to force
the pace if haggling committees are slow in reaching agreement. He is
predisposed to welcome any pressure of fiction or steamroller tactics
which seems likely to accelerate the process. If a plan otherwise capable
of enlisting the necessary formal support, happens to violate the prin-
ciples laid down in Supreme Court decisions, he will wink at technical
evasions and sophistries. If the distinguished counsel who advocate the
plan think they can defend it on appeal or use the lower court's approval
to effect a settlement with dissenters, that is their lookout.
After reorganization has been accomplished, it turns out that the
punitive ideal has only been submerged, not extinguished. Practical
considerations are now no longer compelling. Bondholders who have
compromised remain dissatisfied and their grumblings cost them nothing.
Accumulation of private grumbling may lead to public investigation.
The typical reorganization plan preserves for bondholders as much as
possible in fixed and preferential charges, and appeases the stockholders
largely in securities whose value depends upon an upturn in earnings.
If in fact the upturn comes, then bondholders regret not only the extent
of the concession made to stockholders but also its form. Actual market
II. The last decade or so has seen a much wider extension than ever before of the
classes of people who buy corporate securities. Some of this has resulted from the cus-
tomer ownership campaigns among the public utilities. The original political objective of
mobilizing a larger vested interest in defense of their rate structures has in some instances
been supplanted by a desire to obtain capital by sale of securities for more than they
would bring in the ordinary investment market. See Jules I. Bogen, Irrvcstrncmn Boan.hg
(1932) 8 Ezcyc. Soc. Sconces 268, 272. For criticism of the practice of marketing hold-
ing company securities to operating company customers see, C. B. Kefanver, Joyrie i3
Associated Gas (1933) 77 Naw REPuBLc 66-6S, 94-97; cf. Re N. Y. State Electric & Gas
Corp. [1932E] P. U. R. 1; N. Y. State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Maltbie, 147 Misc. 569, 264




quotations reveal that what was claimed to be an inconsequential con-
cession is now in fact of great value. Those who have all along pro.,
tested the iniquity of the settlement begin to sound more plausible. If
they have not settled for the cash value of their power to obstruct they
cannot now be characterized as blackmailers. There is glamour in the
stubbornness of their lone and protracted struggle against the powerful
in law and finance, contrasted with the supine acquiescence of all others
in the "unfair" plan. Hindsight reveals the reorganization as a racket
and they can say: "I told you so."
The lucky litigant who gets his objections before the Supreme Court
years after the reorganization has been accomplished thus finds an ideal
setting for the vindication of punitive ideals. Practical objection can
be made only by appeal to the remote sanction of possible obstacles to
future reorganizations. It must overcome the feeling that perhaps this
is a wholesome consequence. If promoters and managers learn the
limits of what they can get away with in reorganization, they may be
more cautious, and caution on their part may prevent occasions for
future reorganization.
If emphasis is shifted from reorganization to the whole process to
which it is incident, there is much to be said for the Supreme Court's
leanings toward strict enforcements of creditors' prior rights. The notori-
ous dangers of complicated and pyramided financial structures are
familiar. It is sufficient to summarize the conventional criticisms and
defenses, and to show how the dangers are increased, and how important
sanctions of self-interest, relied on to keep promotion and management
within conservative bounds, fail or falter because stockholders so seldom
bear their expected share of the burden of financial collapse.
Even a relatively simple capital structure may afford striking illus-
tration of these dangers. Suppose that a corporation's capital has been
contributed 70% by mortgage bondholders and general creditors, prom-
ised 6% interest, and the other 30% by stockholders who are running it;
and suppose there is a potential choice between a relatively conservative
managerial policy likely to net 7% on the total capital invested, and a
more reckless one which if successful will net 10%. 12 The alternative re-
12. The choice between a conservative policy which promises moderate returns and a
speculative one which may bring either large returns or disaster is common enough In
business, although one would not expect to find situations where the relative chances of
risk or gain could be reduced to actuarial calculations. The choice may be between ex-
panding the plant to meet a possibly temporary increase in demand, and turning down
orders; between keeping an ample reserve in cash or quick low-yield assets, and using
the same funds for nonliquid high-yield investments; between making forward commitments
for raw material in the hope of getting profits in case the past rising price trend continues,
and hedging; between conservative and speculative investments for an investment company.
Suppose the company is organized to finance installment sales; it may accept only Grade A
risks which will limit it to a 7% return on capital employed or be less particular and
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sulting surpluses for the stock are 9 1/3% and 22 2/3%o. In the language
of the investment community the stock has "leverage." The more ex-
treme the pyramiding, i.e., the ratio between the investment of the man-
agerial group and that of others, the more striking is this leverage. Too
much leverage for the controlling group is regarded by conservative critics
as unsound. They regard the strain upon human frailty as too great
since the less cautious the managers are, the more they stand to gain.
The typical promoter's answer is that leverage works both ways. The
greater risks of those in the equity position are supposed to balance
their greater chance of gain. Fear of increasing their own risks is sup-
posed to be a sufficient deterrent to speculative management. This de-
fense ignores the discrepancy between the presuppositions of finance
and what has been the history of corporate reorganization. It assumes
liquidation as the normal consequence of corporate failure, and that
liquidation will occur just as soon as the shrinkage in gross assets has
wiped out the theoretical margin for the equity group. This unreal
assumption might make it possible to liken the speculative management
group to a person engaged in an honest game of chance, who can play
to win 200% profit only by running a 2 to 1 chance of losing his stake.
Let reorganization enter the picture and the analogy changes. The
long-run tendency of stockholders to wring concessions from those
theoretically ahead of them amounts to loading the dice in their favor.
As an extreme illustration, suppose the common stock is all "water", i.e.,
return for promotional services. Suppose the reorganization plan scales
down prior fixed charges and still allows the common stock to retain an
interest. There has been only a nominal risk, a chance at a large share
of whatever winnings there might have been; yet failure and sacrifice
for everyone else may leave the holders of this water closer to actual
dividends than before. To the extent that reorganization leads to such
results the indirect influence on financial policy and management be-
comes appalling. When cold calculation reinforces the inevitable gam-
bling spirit which it ought to temper, recklessness may become prudence.
However much punitive zeal for strict enforcement of stipulated
priorities may be stimulated by desire to discourage pyramiding and
speculative management, once a financial pyramid is an accomplished
fact, and failure is impending, the danger to senior investors from the
antagonistic self-interest of the management becomes a powerful induce-
ment for practical compromises. The outlook of those who made and
sponsored the senidr investments will not be what it was when heaven
lay round about the infancy of the corporation.
get 10%. In each case the expected return may make an allowance for bad r:s equal
to average experience for the recent normal, prosperous, or boom time years. The real
difference in the probable consequences of the two alternative policies hinges on how soon
there is likely to be a depression.
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In the beginning there may have been confidence that earnings would
cover senior charges by an ample margin and leave a generous surplus
for the common stock. Such hopes tend to divert attention from the
difficulties of enforcing the priorities promised senior claimants and the
possible impact of the financial set-up upon managerial policies. They
also tend to make more experienced investors and sponsoring bankers,
who may think of such risks, dismiss them as negligible.
But when actual earnings fall short of expectations the latent dangers
of the stratified financial structure assume prominence. Declining quo-
tations for the junior stock may make it easy for piratical speculative
groups to buy up control. Even without this, there is likely to be diffi-
culty enough with a stockholder management of only ordinary business
morality. The more important bondholders and, above all, the sponsoring
bankers begin to appraise the delays and uncertainty of the bondholders'
legal remedies and to consider the danger of meanwhile continuing con-
trol in a management which can see no more hopeful way to any return
on its own investment than by gambling against odds or using its strategic
position to bludgeon concessions from those with prior claims. If the
junior equity had no chance of improving its position by reorganization,
its temptation would be to hang on as long as possible to the indirect
perquisites of control and the forlorn hope either that desperate specu-
lations will succeed or that general business revival will restore the par-
ticular company's prosperity.
It is a long and difficult process to dislodge a recalcitrant manage-
ment. It has power to retard by months or even years those "events
of default" which by the terms of the indenture condition rights to
accelerate the maturity of long-term bonds. Matured claims may be
disputed. Insolvency may be denied and evidence of it concealed.
Meanwhile free assets may be pledged, perhaps in secret violation of
covenants,'13 preferences may ripen into undisturbable liens, plant main-
tenance may be utterly inadequate, increasingly shoddy products and
services may gradually destroy good will. Accumulation of unpaid wage
claims may impair the morale of the operating staff and create claims
with either legal or compelling moral priority.
When creditors finally succeed in getting a legal custodian appointed,
they find the cupboard bare indeed. Then comes a battle as to whether
the judicial administration shall be directed primarily to enforcement
of creditors' rights or to conservation of alleged equities in the stock.
Judicial sale may be delayed by invoking one of th most ancient tra-
ditions of equity-that of the chancellor protecting a poor debtor from
13. Cf. First Report of Receivers for Middle West Utilities Co., (1933) 136 Coml. &
Fm. CmoN. 4447. New York Times, March 5, 1935, at 29, col. 1 (report of suit in behalf
of bondholders of Insull Utilities Investments Corporation).
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the rapacity of forfeiture-exacting creditors.' 4 This picture, carried over
from the economy of petty trade, is kept alive by the conventional re-
organization patter about permitting stockholders to preserve their equity
by paying an assessment. In the conditions of general business depres-
sion which accompany most reorganizations the stockholders gain
strength from the universal clamor of debtors for relief against their
creditors. Bondholders are made uncertain how far they may obtain
the full measure of relief prescribed in an indenture. 5
Even where the senior capital is represented by a single issue of bonds
with a closed first mortgage, the stockholders may sometimes derive
advantage from superior facilities for compact organization and from
their wider affiliations in the financial world.'0 To the extent that they
own bonds, or through indirect pressure can control some bondholders
or those to whom bondholders might naturally look for leadership, they
may cause division in bondholders' counsels. In ostensible solicitude
for bondholders, specious objections may be made to a plan which just
because of its favorable treatment of the bonds impinges on the ob-
14. "Those who are subordinate to the first lien have opposed it [foreclosure] bitterly,
since they earnestly believe their expectations to be of the nature of a vested interst, which
should not be interfered with so long as they are willing to bear some sacrifices for the
realization of those expectations. Almost endless and titanic litigations have been the result.
Courts have leaned against the strict forfeiture of equities of redemption forever cutting
off such contingent but vast pecuniary interests. An unwritten law of adjustment, de-
pending neither upon statutory sanction nor upon direct acknowledgment in the opinions
of courts, has come into existence, based on the recognition of what may be called an
ethical patriotic sentiment-that it is a hardship to disappoint expectations resting upon
the faith of the development of our common country. The absolute right of for-sure,
while admitted in theory, is made so difficult of accomplishment in practice that it amounts
almost to a denial of a contract obligation of the railway mortgagors." Simon Sterne,
Railway Reorganization (1890) 10 Foruma 37, 40.
15. The bondholders who sought foreclosure by intervention in an equity receivership
were subject to uncertainty both as to when they could get a :Ae and whether the court
would confirm a bid low enough to make reorganization possible. Sections 77 and 77B of tha
Bankruptcy Act substitute an uncertainty as to whether the court will find the plan to
contain adequate provision for the realization of stockholders' equities, or find the corpora-
tion insolvent.
16. As where a powerful holding company initiates a plan for reorganization of a
subsidiary. The holding company may also be a creditor. It may ostensibly participate
in that capacity alone, but its dominance of the entire situation can not help affecting its
participation as creditor. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogart, 250 U. S. 483 (1919); Mountain
States Power Co. v. Jordan Lumber Co., 286 Fed. 217 (D. Mont. 1923), aff'd 293 Fed. 502
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923), cert. denied 264 U. S. 582 (1924). See a plan dated July 24, 1933 for
reorganization of the Lexington Water Power Co. (1933) 136 Comm. & Ft. Cur.o:;.
4266; (1933) 137 id. at 865. The plan was later abandoned. See (1934) Pooa's
Punrzc Urrrin=s 137. For other simila plans see Atlantic Gas & Electric Corp., (1933) 13&
Comaa. & Fix. CHRoN. 156; Kansas State Telephone Co., id. at 327; Federal Public Sarvie
Co. plan (1933) 137 Id. at 4012; Deep Rock Oil Corp. plan (1934) 139 id. at 1399.
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jectors' major interest in the stock. Objections may be emphasized by
withholding or withdrawing deposit of the bonds controlled.1 7
Where the senior capital is represented by an elaborate hierarchy of
claims, one group may be played off against another. While still in
control of the corporate machinery, the junior stock may threaten long-
term creditors with preferential treatment of short-term obligations, and
short-term creditors with events that will accelerate maturity of the
funded debt. Above all, holders of long-term junior bonds and preferred
stockholders may be threatened with defaults on the senior mortgages.
After a default, stockholders may co-operate with the senior mortgagees,
obtaining for their co-operation a scaling down of junior claims ahead
of theirs.
So wide are the possibilities of variation in corporate financial struc-
tures and in the minor incidents of reorganization that it is easy to lose
sight of the basic problems. Analysis is much simplified if we confine
ourselves to reorganization problems as they appear to whatever group
17. Illustration of the possibilities, at least, is suggested by the various plans and
campaign statements issued in connection with the struggle to reorganize the Fisk Rubber
Company in 1932. The following account is offered as a matter of interpretation of this
obviously biased controversial evidence. The writer has no direct information as to the
actual conflict of ambitions, personalities or issues of business judgment.
The first plan was offered January 25, 1932 on behalf of committees who represented
slightly less than 50% of the bondholders and who had failed to reach agreement with
a stockholders' committee. The plan contained a subscription offer which was not under-
written, but the committee was prepared to proceed with the existing working capital In
case no more should be made available. It offered bondholders and creditors no cash and
no interest-bearing obligations, merely preferred and common stock. If subscriptions were
not exercised this would be the entire stock, except for some common stock to be given,
and some to be subject to option rights extended, to a new chief executive. Even if all
the subscription privileges were exercised, the old creditors would hold a substantial major-
ity of the stock. Subscription privileges to additional preferred and common stock were
offered to each class of creditors and stockholders. Stockholders were offered nothing fur-
ther. If we accept the proponents' judgment on various debatable questions of busine
policy (their opponents suggested no reason to doubt their good faith) the plan was as
favorable to bondholders as it was unpalatable to stockholders.
Without waiting opportunity for legal obstruction, the stockholders' committee at once
began a campaign to discourage bondholders' acceptance of the plan. One large bond-
holder joined this opposition. As such he appealed to his fellow bondholders, disclosing
incidentally that he was also a stockholder, but not saying in which capacity he was most
largely interested. While debate was raging, an independent bondholder-group sprang up,
urging the maximum distribution of cash, and intervened in the receivership to insist upon
an immediate payment on account. This apparently frightened the original bondholders'
committee into a settlement with the stockholders and the large bondholder who bad sided
with them. The new plan involved a substantial cash payment to bondholders, the cash
to be supplied by assessing the stockholders. The inducement to obtain this cash from
stockholders meant far better terms for them than the earlier plan had proposed. There
was also a modification of the proposals for change of management. See (1932) 134
Comi-. & Fin. CHRON. 1033, 1202, 1381, 1769, 2157, 2348, 3987, 4164; (1932) 135 id. at
1662, 2344; (1933) 136 id. at 2618, 4096.
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of security holders has the major stake in getting reorganization accom-
plished. This is the group which is faced with the probability of some
loss but which has substantial hopes of salvage. If it can avoid ultimate
loss, it can do so by only a narrow margin. For convenience we shall
hereafter refer to it as the marginal group. It may consist of the first
mortgage bondholders or junior bondholders or unsecured creditors.
Creditors senior to the marginal group are probably so amply secured
that they have no need to bestir themselves about reorganization. But
if prospects for the business should change during a prolonged period
of reorganization negotiations, the marginal status may shift from one
group to another.
Meeting interest requirements on the senior claims-or principal if
they are matured-is simply one problem which confronts the marginal
group. A second problem is dealing with dissenters and with those
theoretically subordinate to the marginal group in the hierarchy of claims.
The hypothesis that the marginal group is not adequately secured implies
that creditors junior to them, and above all stockholders, have only
remote expectancies of receiving anything in case the stipulated order
of priorities should be observed. Delay pending an upturn in business
may conceivably ripen this remote expectancy into something more sub-
stantial-but delay means further accumulation of prior charges and
perhaps also added costs and loss of earning capacity. Usually the value
of the junior claims is essentially a hold-up value. As a group their
bargaining strength lies in their having little left to lose and some power
to obstruct those who still have much to lose. Dissenting members of
the marginal group, in proportion as their holdings are small compared
with the majority's, have relatively less to lose, and in turn may force
concessions from the majority if they have any power to obstruct.
Thus far attention has been focused principally upon the obstructive
capacity of stockholders and the ethical objections to their using it to
advance themselves beyond their theoretical position in the hierarchy
of claims. Junior creditors and dissenters would have a relatively in-
significant power to obstruct but for the fact that equitable weapons
developed ostensibly to curb the stockholders have incidentally played
into their hands. The same individualistic tradition which condemns
stockholders for trying to evade the stipulated consequences of failure
insists upon aiding only those creditors who are vigilant and aggressive
in fighting for their rights. Bondholders who acquiesce in an unfair
plan are held as rigorously to the new bargain as the stockholders should
theoretically have been held to the old. Thus the "strikers"--whether
entire groups of opposing creditors or dissenters-who alone are free
to challenge the unfair benefit to stockholders, may take advantage of
what has been yielded by the consenting bondholders. Where such a
windfall to strikers is not expected, or where the stockholders are in
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a strong enough bargaining position to refuse to assume this risk, it
may happen that the burden of any recovery by strikers will fall pri-
marily upon the victimized assenting bondholders. The Supreme Court
condemnation of devices to advance the stockholders over creditors has
not relieved the unfortunate marginal group from the necessity of pay-
ing toll to stockholders as a condition to realizing effectively upon their
security. It has sometimes forced them to pay an additional toll to dis-
senters and junior creditors as a condition to being permitted to appease
the stockholders.
Whatever the legal obstacles to compromising with stockholders, the
pressure to do so is overwhelming. The practical reorganizer sees only
the absurdly wasteful alternative of waging a war of attrition for the
eventual possession of a gutted and shell-tom corporation. The scat-
tered character of the parties whose interests are to be compromised
and the necessity of circumventing legal obstacles tend to drive the
process of compromise underground. The extra-legal government of
the financial community operates through pressures and loyalties, patron-
age and compulsions far too subtle to be set forth in terms of offer and
acceptance.
The initial step of invoking judicial administration of the property
by instigating a friendly receivership or filing a petition for reorganiza-
tion in bankruptcy will come long before it is possible to commit bond-
holders to any promises. It may be taken, however, at the suggestion
of the banker who has sponsored the bond issue, and to whom the bond-
holders will look for leadership in reorganization. 18 The ability to get
reorganizations done is said to depend largely upon the prestige of the
banker who assumes to direct. This prestige involves both a reputation
for getting reorganization done and for dealing fairly with those who
put themselves in the banker's power. Willingness of the management
to surrender at a hint from the banker will usually imply that the
,management will be confident of receiving fair treatment for stockholders
in the eventual reorganization plan. "Fair" treatment according to the
business view implies some recognition of the value to the senior claim-
ants of the obstructive powers surrendered-precisely what the Supreme
Court would regard as unfair.
Sometimes the management itself takes th initiative in arranging for
a judicial administration. This is particularly likely if there is no agres-
18. See Cravath, supra note 9, at 156-161. DEWINo, FnmANCc , Pomcy or CopromA-
TIONS (3d ed. 1934) 1104, 1119. Cravath assumes that the banker who issued the corpora-
ion's bonds will normally take the initiative in arranging for a friendly receivership.
Dewing perhaps tacitly makes the same assumption, but begins his description of the
practice with the decision of the debtor's directors to arrange a friendly receivership, For




sive or independent banking sponsorship for claims which the manage-
ment hopes to scale down. The management may feel that whatever
loss of bargaining power is incident to this nominal surrender of control
is outweighed by other advantages. Receivership or bankruptcy serves
to dramatize the crisis in corporate affairs and helps to prepare the minds
of security holders for accepting some sacrifices. It may be desired to
guard against attachment. The management's confidence of being able
to come to terms with the bondholders usually makes it anxious to con-
serve quick assets so that more will be available to divide between bond-
holders and stockholders. Perhaps a friendly judicial administration is
rushed to forestall an unfriendly one.
The extent to which there may have been co-operation rather than
bickering as to the handling of the corporate affairs pending reorganiza-
tion is only one of the many variables which tend to shape the ultimate
compromise in the reorganization plan itself. There is a question as
to the proportionate sharing of each group in the aggregate speculative
value attributable to the property. This aggregate is usually reflected
in market quotations. There is also a question as to the form of securi-
ties which shall embody this expectancy. It may be that the aggregate
of market values can be enhanced by using securities which place the
minimum emphasis upon deflations of past hopes consistent with avoid-
ing too great a risk of subsequent insolvency.
The actual forms used will depend upon prevailing popularity with
investors at large of particular types of securities, peculiar variations
which may have appealed to persons dominant in the negotiation of
the plan; the probability of challenge by strikers, together with current
legal opinion as to what is least likely to be upset in the light of existing
precedents. The controlling precedents are a handful of Supreme Court
decisions. Attempt will be made to examine these decisions for their
impact upon the actual reorganizations dealt with, and for their effect
upon subsequent reorganization practice. Except for an early decision
before the reorganization technique had been fully perfected it appears
that the court has not been very effective in preventing arrangements
"by which the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are
... secured at the expense of ...prior rights. . . ."-' In fact the
whole substantive law of reorganization is a memorial to the evasions of
this simple prohibition.
THE HowARD CASE
The Supreme Court decisions which condemn practical compromises
with stockholders go back to Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
19. Louisvile Trust Co. v. Louisville & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674, 684 (1S99).
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road Co. v. Howard.20 Here there was no assessment and it was clear
that the only consideration for the stockholders' participation was non-
exercise of power to obstruct creditors. Outsiders happened to be inter-
ested in the properties of a debt-burdened road, at a price below the
aggregate face value of its mortgages. The mortgages amounted to
$7,000,000 and the offer was $5,500,000 in new bonds to be secured
by the same and certain additional properties. Stockholders' co-operation
was enlisted by a promise of 16% of par. This made it necessary to
scale the participation of the lowest ranking mortgage-bondholders to
only 30%. The alternative was delay, possible loss of the outside bid
and the risk of being wiped out by strict foreclosure of the senior mort-
gage. It was not proposed to offer anything to the holders of certain
municipal bonds which had been issued in payment for stock and sold
with the guarantee of the debtor road.
Committees of bond and stockholders having concluded the bargain,
the problem remained to make it effective against dissenting junior bond-
holders who might want more than 30%, and against the holders of
guarantees. As yet there was no conventional way of handling this
problem. The machinery utilized was an uncontested foreclosure sale.
The mortgagor joined in the conveyance and the trustees released their
mortgages. The formal bid was only $2,200,000. Whether frightened
by the low bid and the possible alternative of losing everything, or satis-
fied with the compromise payment of 30%, no junior bondholders ven-
tured to litigate.21 The legal challenge to the plan came from the ignored
holders of guarantees. They managed to reduce their claims to judg-
ment and as judgment creditors successfully levied equitable attachment
upon the still undistributed fund for stockholders.
Both argument and opinion rested on narrow grounds. It was clear
that prior to the arrangement there had been no surplus for unsecured
creditors. Otherwise junior bondholders could not have been induced
to accept so small a percentage of their claims. Therefore, argued the
stockholders, unsecured creditors could not complain if bondholders
permitted part of what was rightfully theirs to be used to appease stock-
holders. But the judgment creditors convinced the court that bond-
holders had agreed with the corporation as such, to settle and release
their mortgages on a basis that did not exhaust the proceeds of sale.
The surplus was, therefore, an unencumbered corporate asset. Of course
it followed that creditors could reach it ahead of stockholders.
20. 7 Wall. 392 (U. S. 1868). For an interesting analysis of this case see Jerome Frank,
Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganizations (1933) 19 VA.
L. REv. 541. Frank's analysis stresses the fact that old security holders were interested in
the purchaser corporation, and thus emphasizes the similarity of the arrangement to the
typical reorganization.
21. Some dissenting bondholders had originally instituted the foreclosure proceeding but
they were bought off. With the control of their suit thus obtained it was continued in
furtherance of the plan.
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In thus overriding the obvious intent of the parties to the arrangement
the court avoided formulating any broad equitable principles. It did
not have occasion to do so until the Monon2 - case thirty years later. The
interval was a critical period in the development of reorganization prac-
tice. It was a time of rapid growth and frequent collapse of railroad
systems. Leadership in reorganizations got centralized in a narrow group,
accelerating the standardization of techniques. The reorganization bar
did not have to reckon with any generalized denunciation of the inevi-
table concession to stockholders. The Howard case indicated the Su-
preme Court's feeling that it is inequitable to permit stockholders to
capitalize their strategic position to obstruct, but the pressure of cir-
cumstances made reorganizers prefer not to take the hint. Then as now,
in the complicated strategy of reorganization, guesses as to how the Su-
preme Court might react to a plan, in the unlikely event that some small
group of objectors should get before it, counted for little. Much more im-
portant was the prestige and skillful use of techniques of persuasion by
those who assumed to direct; their arrangements to dispense patronage
and to finance elaborate campaigns of propaganda; their shrewdness in
conforming to the prejudices and standards of fairness of the business
community where these happened to be at variance with equitable stan-
dards set forth in law books. The Howard case did not block compro-
mises with stockholders; it was merely an isolated reef to be avoided.
Later cases indicated other reefs and shoals, but as each was carefully
noted on the navigator's charts, it still remained possible for a skillful
pilot with average luck to find a way through.
Legal ingenuity and varying business conditions usually make it pos-
sible to give to a scheme of reorganization some form which is not clearly
invalidated by any of the existing precedents. It is possible to classify
roughly under three heads the ways in which reorganizers have sought
to escape the naive expression of the compromise with stockholders which
the Howard case had proved to be vulnerable: I. Making the reorgani-
zation appear to involve only a voluntary exchange of new securities for
old, and leaving seemingly undisturbed the existing rights of nonpartici-
pants. II. Introducing complicated contingencies into the settlement
as an obstacle to contestants' meeting the burden of proving that stock-
holders have been advanced at the expense of creditors' rights. In. Cov-
ering up the concession to stockholders in the terms of a sale to them of
new securities. The first two will now be discussed in order; the third,
postponed until a subsequent article.
I. PSEUDO-VOLUNTARY REORGANIZATIONS
In the early nineties an arrangement was made to turn over the newly
22. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899).
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built and disappointing Chattanooga, Rome & Columbus Railroad to a
subsidiary of the Central Railroad and Banking Corporation of Georgia.
First mortgage bondholders were to have their claims assumed, junior
bondholders were to receive 15% of face value and stockholders 7Y4 %
of par in new bonds. Nothing was offered to general creditors. The set-
tlement was strikingly similar to that involved in the Howard case, but
whatever counsel arranged the plan was evidently too bold and too in-
genious to regard the Howard case as an insuperable obstacle. Instead
of transferring the properties by foreclosure sale, releasing the mortgage
and thereby making room for an argument that the corporation as such
was settling with secured creditors and leaving an attachable surplus
for dissenters and junior creditors, the road was leased for a considera-
tion that could not be attacked as inadequate, but which left no sur-
plus, and the exchanged securities were kept alive. The new bonds were
bonds of the lessee guaranteed by its parent the Central. In considera-
tion of its guarantee the Central received the old junior bonds and stock.
If the lease was challenged the assets would nevertheless remain sub-
ject to the mortgage, a dominant majority of the bonds would be held
by the Central, and it could choose its own time for foreclosure.
The scheme seems to have enlisted enough exchanges by junior bond-
holders to make it worth while to go ahead, and it probably appeared
invulnerable to such of them as were dissatisfied, as well as to most of
the general creditors. Challenge came only from the stubborn holder of
one small claim, who may have been emboldened by an alternative theory
that local statutes gave his claim priority over the recorded mortgages.
He insisted that there was a fraudulent conveyance and attached the
property which had been turned over to the lessee. His attachment was
sustained. The decision sustaining it was affirmed by a strong Circuit
Court of Appeals consisting of Taft, Lurton and Severens.23  Taft's
opinion anticipates Brewer's sweeping language in the Monon case. 4
"Any device by which the assets of an insolvent corporation are to be par-
celled out between shareholders, leaving creditors unpaid, is a fraud of which
creditors affected may complain.... The shares were manifestly worthless. The
price paid for them was really a part of the price paid for the corporate property.
... For their assent to the sale they demanded and received a part of the con-
sideration to be paid for the corporate property.125
23. Chattanooga, Rome and Columbus Rr. Co. v. Evans, 66 Fed. 809 (C. C. A. 6th
1895). For further information see (1891) PooR's MA.NUAL OF RAMrrOADS 91-97, 410-41S.
The Central owned all the stock of the Savannah & Western, which leased the Chattanooga.
There had been no common directors as between the Chattanooga and the other roadg.
The Central had become a part of the Richmond and Danville system in 1888. See DAo-
Grr, RMOAD REORGA.MTZATON (1924) 165.
24. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899).
25. Chattanooga, Rome & Columbus Rr. Co. v. Evans, 66 Fed. 809, 822 (C, C. A. 6th,
1895). The fact that this one creditor perfected an attachment upon the assets transferred:
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One weakness of the arrangements involved in both the Howard case
and the Chattanooga case was that the exchange of securities accom-
panied, and was obviously related to, the contemporaneous transfer of
all the corporation's assets. It was only necessary to establish the doc-
trine that when an embarrassed corporation transfers all of its assets, ben-
efit to the stockholders is, by disregard of the corporate fiction, equivalent
to benefit to the debtor 6 Such transactions would then clearly constitute
fraudulent conveyances. This technical weakness might seem to be obvi-
ated by providing for an exchange of new securities for old, without ex-
plicitly contemplating any transfer of assets. The corporation as an
accounting entity would have the same assets and liabilities as before.
Nondepositing junior bondholders would hold the same proportionate in-
terest in the same lien, and general creditors would be subordinate to
the same lien as before. While the arrangement for unified control of
the participating bonds and stock would leave nonparticipants in a posi-
tion of hopeless insecurity, it might be difficult for them to persuade the
courts to take cognizance of such an intangible method of coercion. The
transferee as holder of a dominant majority of the old bonds and stock
could choose its own time to precipitate a foreclosure sale at which it
would be the only possible bidder.
This device was an incidental feature of the reorganization in 1899
which gave rise to the present Kansas City Southern Railway.'- The
plan contemplated unified operation of the properties of three companies
called for short the "Gulf," the "Dock," and the "Belt." The Dock Com-
pany was at the southern terminus and the Belt at the northern termi-
nus of the Gulf road. There was to be immediate foreclosure of the main
to the lessee did not mean that the elaborate subterfuge to avoid the Howard case had
failed to serve its purpose for this reorganization. It is probable that all of the junior
bondholders had long since accepted their 15% in new bonds, unaware of the opportunity
of dissenters to obtain 100% in cash, and that general creditors' claims at large had been
disposed of cheaply enough as a result of ignorance, inertia, nominal settlements and the
statute of limitations.
26. See Gerdes, A Fair and Equitable Plan of Corporate Reorganiation Urder Section
77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1, 16. The disregard of the
corporate fiction is implicit in treating the stockholders collectively as the debtor; but
neither the Supreme Court decisions nor the commentators upon them have bothered to
articulate the problem in these terms. Assuming as a starting point that the corporate
fiction will be disregarded makes the problem look too easy. Such an assumption par-
mitted Frank to jibe the leaders of the reorganization bar for not seeing, as any country
lawyer would, the inevitability of the Supreme Court decisions which have characterized
their conventional practices as fraudulent. The country lawyer would have seen that
stockholder's participation is equivalent to a farmer mortgagors purchasing at the fore-
closure of his own mortgage. See Frank, supra note 20, at 549. If Frank intended more
than a playful nose-tweaking of some of his brethren, he fails to give them their due.
Some country lawyers may have won their Boyd cases, but the reorganizers have won the
campaigns.
27. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S. 165 (1916),
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line Gulf mortgage, transfer of its properties to the new company, and
assessment of the Gulf stockholders as a condition to participation. With
these conventional features we are not here concerned. In addition the
plan contemplated exchange of securities of the new company for stocks
and bonds of the Belt and Dock without immediate foreclosure of their
mortgages, and without assessing their stockholders. The securities of-
fered Dock bondholders were contemporaneously quoted at only about
half the face amount of their bonds.2 Nevertheless, there is no record
of any challenge based on the participation awarded to the Dock stock-
holders.29 The Belt bondholders had no reason to complain because
they received new securities worth the full face value of their old bonds. 8
There was a prolonged litigation with the Guardian Trust Company,
which ultimately established its status as a general creditor of the Belt
28. See quotations supplement to (June 2, 1900) 70 Comm. & Fn . CURoN. Con-
temporary market appraisal can only be approximated as there was not a wide market for
the Dock and Belt securities, and the new Kansas City Southern securities were not traded
in until some months after the plan was declared effective. There were however Interim
quotations for the old Gulf bonds and stock. These were tolerably stable and thus indicate
the relevance of the later quotations for the new securities as indicating about what they
seemed to be worth when the plan was announced. Taking 172 for the new common
(sale price April 19, 1900), 42 for the new preferred (low of 41 on April 6 and high 43
on April 3) and 603/ for the bonds (first sale May 18) the participation offered Dock
Bondholders would be worth approximately $625 per $1000 face value of old bonds, whereas
Dock stockholders would receive securities worth $130 per $1000 of par value. Belt
bondholders received securities worth the full face value. Belt stockholders received securi-
ties worth $230 per $1000 par value.
29. Two competing groups had attempted to effect a reorganization, a Philadelphia
group and a New York group. The Philadelphia group's plan was first announced and
involved the reorganization of all three companies. The New York plan (Aug. 31, 1879)
was urged as more favorable to Gulf security holders. It advocated reorganizing the Gulf
first and then letting the reorganized company continue negotiations with the other groups
or make other arrangements for terminal facilities. There were also competing theories
as to the amount of fixed charges which the reorganized road could safely carry. The
plan finally adopted was a compromise. It is a fair inference from the campaign documents
that those active in the struggle were competing to control the reorganized system and
perhaps there was also a minor issue as to the relative value of each of the three properties
involved-but no sharp cleavage between Dock bondholders and Dock stockholders, be-
cause they were largely the same persons. The few who held Dock bonds and not Dock
stock would be likely to accept the plan because it was recommended to them, and not
suspect that those who recommended it had any ulterior motives at stake. See (1899)
PooR's MA zrmtAL oF RAiLROADs 555; (1900) id. at 658. For preliminary plans see (1899)
69 Cowrm. & Fix. Cnox. 384, 440, 491. E. H. Harriman was connected with the New
York group. When the Philadelphia group came to terms with the New York group
this incidentally involved the prospect of friendly rather than unfriendly relations with the
Union Pacific, Chicago & Alton "and other important systems." Id. at 956. Dutch in-
vestors, bargaining collectively, held a majority of the Dock and Belt securities; also a
substantial amount of Gulf securities. Id. at 1257. When the compromise plan was de-
clared operative on Dec. 18, 1899, deposits claimed included $1,489,000 out of $1,945,000
Dock bonds and $1,575,000 out of $1,635,000 par of stock. Id. at 1346.
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and as such was held entitled to payment in full by the new company,
which had meanwhile caused a foreclosure of the Belt mortgage and bid
in the property in its capacity as bondholder. In behalf of the new com-
pany it was solemnly argued that the exchange of securities was a thing
quite independent of the subsequent foreclosure sale, and therefore of
no concern to nonparticipants; and that the new company acted strictly
according to its rights in using its holdings of Belt bonds to acquire the
Belt properties at the ultimate foreclosure sale.* Answering this argu-
ment Mr. Justice Holmes said,
"But the ownership of the Belt road by the new company was contemplated
from the first and although no fraud on creditors was suggested or intended in
the plan,31 still the Court of Appeals was justified in regarding the whole pro-
ceeding as one from the start to the close and in throwing on the appellant the
responsibility of so carrying it out as to avoid inequitable results."
32
The Kansas City Southern case does not go far toward establishing
a basis for equitable control over so-called voluntary reorganizations.
It was something to have established the substantive principle that re-
organizers and their corporate instrumentalities are to be fixed with re-
sponsibility for so carrying out their plans "as to avoid inequitable re-
suits" no matter how subtle the means employed; whether they employ
the traditional immediate pressure of judicial sale or some remoter and
more intangible pressure that comes from arranging for a weakened stra-
tegic position with reference to ultimate liquidation, at an unpredictable
future date, of those who do not participate in the plan. But here, as
elsewhere in dealing with complex corporate problems, the procedural
imponderables may be far more important than substantive principles.
Unfortunately the procedure which happened to result in eventual victory
for the Guardian Trust Company would not be worth much to relieve
the average small bondholder from pressure to acquiesce in a plan he
believes inequitable. The Guardian Trust Company had a large claim
not dealt with by the plan; it was not confronted with any choice be-
tween receiving something under the plan and waiting to assert its claim
against the reorganized company; and there was no long delay by the new
corporation in foreclosing the mortgage on the Belt company. By con-
trast, a dissatisfied bondholder may have a relatively small amount at
stake, and will be obliged to forego accepting what is offered him under
the plan if he insists that he is entitled to more. Besides the familiar
30. See Point XI, Brief of appellant and petitioner before Supreme Court, at 136-13S.
31. The plan suggested some payment to creditors as among the objects for rasing new
money. One of the issues argued was as to whether this justified the trust company in
assuming that its claim as general creditor would be taken care of, or whether it bhcame
estopped to claim in this capacity by depositing stocks and bonds in furtherance of the
plan, and urging others to do so.
32. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S. 166, 177 (1916).
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obstacles which confront small bondholders in case they wish to chal-
lenge the fairness of a reorganization plan put through in connection
with a foreclosure sale, there is the additional hardship of having to
forego the advantage of liquidity for his investment and being subject
to uncertainty while awaiting liquidition at some unknown future date
before he can even begin his attack.
To remove these obstacles to redress he would have to be given oppor-
tunity to challenge the plan by injunction just as soon as he is subjected
to any pressure to comply with it. Unfortunately the issues of fact as to
the existence of pressure and as to the fairness of the plan can be made
complex and confusing, and the slightest possibility that the plan will
ultimately be found fair will make the remedy of injunction seem too
drastic, and too subject to abuse by strikers, for the bona fide objector
to have much chance of getting it. The judge asked to enjoin what the
proponents maintain is a voluntary plan will probably prefer to wait and
see how many bondholders will accept it before dealing with any claims
of intangible pressure. Typical methods of complicating analysis as to
the fairness of a plan are outlined in the latter part of this article. These
are available whether the technique of obtaining acceptance is frankly
involuntary or assumes the form of offering an opportunity for voluntary
exchange. A more complete discussion of the peculiar difficulties of en-
forcing any limitations on the scope of pseudo-voluntary reorganization
plans must be reserved for a future article.
II. CONTINGENT SETTLEMENTS WITH STOCKHOLDERS
The Miracle of the Loaves and Fishes
The Howard case seemed to indicate that junior creditors (and by in-
ference dissenters as well) have an interest in what inadequately secured
mortgage bondholders may concede to stockholders out of that "which
is rightfully theirs"-i. e., which bondholders are entitled to acquire for
themselves at foreclosure sale.83 One difficulty with the form of settle-
ment involved in the Howard case was that it reduced all interests recog-
nized in the plan to a common denominator, thus clearly revealing that
the basis for settlement was relative bargaining power. Furthermore
there was chosen for this common denominator a new security conserva-
tively reflecting the actual present plight of the debtor corporation, and
therefore below the aggregate of the existing mortgages. The admission
that there was not enough to take care of creditors made it inequitable
for stockholders to receive anything. Future reorganizers learned to
avoid such admission. It became part of their task to "pass a miracle."
If the reorganizers can conjure up a capital structure for the new com-
33. See page 938, supra.
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pany, with a sufficient amount of new securities, subject to sufficient con-
tingencies, they can offer full "recognition" of all creditors' claims against
the old company in new securities nominally equivalent in face value and
priority to the old ones, yet so circumscribed as to correspond in actual
present speculative value to the relative bargaining power of each group
of old security holders. There can then remain as many baskets full of
equity as is necessary to appease the old stockholders.
It does not seem a material obstacle to obtain assent to a plan that the
"adjustment" or income bonds or noncumulative preferred stocks which
are so characteristic of reorganization, are quite unlike the bonds and
stocks which would be used to raise new capital. In fact such elusive con-
tingencies in the capital structure of the reorganized company actually
make it easy to enlist support from enough bond and stockholders to en-
able the reorganizers to put pressure on the rest. A reorganization plan,
like a party platform, must often promise all things to all men. Re-
organizers find the line of least resistance in catering to prejudices and
illusions. It may be that bondholders will be content with less substance
if the name is suggestive of security. It may be that stockholders, whose
insistence upon participation is based on arguments that the present low-
rated earnings are only temporary, really believe it. If so, they may be
appeased, with least irritation to bondholders, by securities whose value
is contingent upon their predictions coming true.
All that is needed to make such nebulous securities as income bonds
and noncumulative preferred stock a valid tender for paying off dis-
senting bondholders and junior creditors is the relatively easy legal trick
of redefining creditors rights as in "equity" or in "substance" something
quite different from what was promised them. Creditors promised pay-
ment at a certain date, or earlier in the event of default, or interest at a
stipulated rate, will find in the Looking-Glass Land of reorganization
"equity" that the "substance" of their right is only a contingent claim to
occasional income at perhaps a lower rate. The incorporation of the un-
predictable future into the terms of the settlement gives reorganizers a
powerful advantage in defending their plan before judges predisposed to
co-operate in bringing about reorganization, and against attack from con-
testants who have the formal burden of proving it inequitable. To find
that the contestants have failed to meet the burden upon them, the chan-
cellor has only to ignore as irrelevant the current market appraisals of
the new securities, and to reject any other evidence as too speculative.
Arguments stressing the contingent character of the settlement, and
the preservation of relative priorities, appear chiefly for their make-
weight value in connection with other arguments. Their part in the cases
dealing with assessment of stockholders will be considered later. They
have been used to justify allowing stockholders participation without
assessment, sometimes in illogical conjunction with the argument that,
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since there would have been no surplus if senior bondholders had their
due, there was no "fraudulent" collusion of stockholders and bondholders
to take away anything which the objecting general creditors might other-
wise have received. The "no actual fraud" argument, which as we have
seen failed in the Howard case, nevertheless continued long afterwards
to serve the reorganizers in defending their plans before lower federal
courts.
In the Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw reorganization in the late seven-
ties, the stockholders of the old company received all of the common
stock of the new. One of the general creditors, whom the plan offered
merely second preferred income bonds, attempted to satisfy his claim
out of the participation offered stockholders, but failed. District Judge
Blodgett approved the plan as fair and distinguished the Howard case,
saying:
"The stockholders are placed behind the holders of these bonds, and the plan
seems to fairly contemplate the protection of all classes of creditors of the old
company in the equitable order of their priority. It was the evident purpose...
to place these floating-debt holders in at least as good a relation to the new
company as they bore to the old company."
It was also emphasized that but for the plan there would have been
nothing for the objecting creditors 4
The relative priority theory was not used again as the basis for a judi-
cial opinion until it reappeared in more complicated form after the Boyd
case in connection with reorganizations which assess stockholders.l It
was doubtless used meanwhile in informal arguments of counsel, in the
negotiation of plans and in persuading security holders to accept them.
34. See Hancock v. Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Rr. Co., 9 Fed. 738, 742 (N. D. Il1.
1882). The plan is summarized in (1877) 25 Comm. & Fru. CuaoN. 115. See also (1880)
30 id. at 170, for further details as to the securities of the reorganized company. AlU
participants of the plan whether bondholders, stockholders, or creditors were required to
contribute ratably to expenses; but such contribution ai this involved from the stock-
holders would necessarily be too small to be regarded as an assessment. The plan substi-
tuted a first mortgage on the system for divisional first mortgages carrying the same rate
of interest. Some of the junior bondholders were forced to exchange their fixed interest
securities for a contingent charge senior in rank to the income bonds offered to general
creditors. The stock capitalization was cut down and simplified, old first preferred getting
50% in new common; old second preferred and old common, 25% in new common. Prior
to the opinion in this case, the reorganized road had been leased to the Wabash. In
connection with the lease Wabash common was offered at the rate of 1 share per $100
face value of Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw second preferred income bonds, and 1 share for
3 shares of the common stock of the reorganized system. The net effect of the plan and
the lease was to enable some old stockholders to salvage one sixth as much, others one
ninth as much per $100 par as was salvaged on each $100 of the old general creditors'
claims. The Wabash common could not have been regarded as a very substantial salvage,
It in turn had to be reorganized in 1884. See DEwxNO, FinANCAL Poract or CORPORA-
TioNs (3d ed. 1934) 1144.
35. This will be developed in a future article.
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It is implicit in the typical financial structures of reorganized corpora-
tions, with their substitution of contingent for fixed-charge securities,
followed by stock representing the old equity interests. Litigation in
connection with the Southern Railway3" and the Central of Georgia3 7
36. This reorganization involved the security holders of the holding company, and two
of its main operating systems, the Richmond and Danville and the East Tennesee. The
new corporation which resulted is the present Southern Railway. The holding company
held almost all of the stock of the Richmond & Danville and a majority of stock in the
East Tennessee. It also was a creditor and held various branch line bonds. No parti-
cipation was offered with respect to any Richmond & Danville stock. The public holders
of East Tennessee stock were offered participation on payment of an ascssment. The
holding company as such had no funds available to pay an assessment and the privileges
incident to its holdings in East Tennessee stock were passed on to its common stock-
holders. The holding company's collateral trust bondholders were forced to accept drastic
sacrifices by way of substituting contingent for fixed charges on the theory, it would seem,
that there was no market for and only conjectural income possibilities from their -rcurity.
Nevertheless the holding company preferred stockholders received new stock without ass,2e3-
ment. This was afterwards defended before the Supreme Court against attack as in
violation of the Howard case, by the assertion that they participated because they had
an equity in the holding company's claim as creditor of the Richmond & Danville. It
happened that the challenge came, not from the holding company bondholders, who would
seem to have been in the best position to object, but from an unpaid supply creditor of
the Richmond & Danville. The Supreme Court's decision in favor of the supply creditor
was on the theory of an equitable right to priority over the mortgages. (Vague references
to the size and complexity of the system were found to justify departure from the uzual
6 months time limit). The court did not attempt to solve the elusive question as to
whether in reality the plan involved a fraudulent disposition of the proprties of the
Richmond & Danville. Cf. Southern Railway Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257
(1900). See Point IV of Appellee's brief and supplemental brief of applant. The case
was argued in October 1898 and not decided until January 1900; meanwhile the Moron
case had come before the court on April 24, 1899 and been decided May 26, 1899. Per-
haps the court regarded the Monon case as a sufficiently illuminating exposition of re-
organization principles, and preferred not to struggle with applying it to the complicated
facts of the Southern Railway reorganization. For history of the Southern Railway system
and its predecessors, see DAGErr, RAu0toAD RDRGANIZATION (1924) c. V.
37. There was a separate receivership for the Central, and its reorganization followed
the Southern Railway reorganization. Agitation as to possible suppression of compztition,
and possibly business considerations, made for doubts as to whether its combination with
the rest of the Terminal system should continue. The plan set up three successive is ues
of income bonds. The first two went to some of the old bondholders. No formal offer
of participation was extended to general creditors. The reorganization committee acquired
such claims as could be purchased on terms satisfactory to it; the terms were not made
public. In negotiation it could threaten to limit dissenters to their pro rata share of what
the unmortgaged assets might bring at a sale dominated by the reorganization committee.
The minority stockholders of the Central received third preference income bonds, and the
Reorganization Committee for the Southern received in exchange for the old majority
holdings of the Terminal company the entire common stock of the new company. (This
was held by it until 1907 and then sold. It afterwards passed into the hands of E. H.
Harriman and associates. See DAcswr, op. cit. supra note 36, at 188). A d Lentng
general creditor succeeded in attacking the plan as fraudulent within the meaning of the
Howard and Chattanooga cases. Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Paul, 93 Fed. 873
(C. C. A. 5th, 1899). The claim was a small one. An alternative theory of priority was
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reorganizations which followed the collapse of the Richmond Terminal
system in the nineties, reveals instances where bondholders accepted
apparently without protest contingent-charge securities, despite the fact
that stockholders retained an interest and paid no assessment. The
challenges came only from general creditors denied participation, and
in each instance by creditors having an unusual stimulus to litigate be-
cause of alternative theories which would give' their claims priority over
the old mortgages. It would not be surprising if there were many
similar plans throughout the history of reorganization which did not get
into the reports at all.
Following the stock market collapse of 1929, numerous reorganization
plans were announced which dealt drastically with creditors claims and
nevertheless allowed stockholders participation without assessment.
Either because no new money was needed, or because the stockholders
were unwilling or unable to pay them, it was not feasible to levy assess-
ments. The extent of the participation offered stockholders would natu-
rally depend upon their actual bargaining position in each instance. In
some reorganizations they seem to have received a relatively insignificant
sop; in others they retained most of their former equity in addition to
having their chances of ultimate dividends improved by an absolute
scaling down of the claims ahead of them. It is probable that in many
instances the reorganizers counted on the ignorance and inertia of scat-
tered bondholders, and upon extra-legal pressure to compel general ac-
ceptance of these plans. There was scarcely a gesture of buttressing
them against legal attack from dissenters."
Reorganization and the Concept of a Moratorium
The ancient concept of a moratorium stands in the background of
partially responsible for inducing the challenge. The lone aggressive creditor got paid, but
the plan itself was not upset. There was no record of challenge by any bondholders.
There was, however, subsequent litigation which revealed to the bondholders tho full
extent to which they had been prejudiced by consenting to receive income bonds, while
perpetuating a common stock control whose nebulous equity could only be made to amount
to something by concealing earnings and using what should have been payable as interest
to build up a basis for eventual dividends on the common. See Dewing, The Position ol
Income Bonds as Illustrated by Those of the Central of Georgia Railway (1911) 29 Q.
JouR'. oF EcoN. 396.
38. For example see the following among the plans appearing in the Commercial &
Financial Chronicle between January 1, 1932 and July 1, 1934: Pacific Steamship Co.,
(1932) 134 Comm. & Fnr. CEmoy. 144; Mount Hope Bridge Co., id. at 1039; Continental
Clay Products Corp., id. at 1378; Baxter Laundries Inc., id. at 3463; Pierce Butler & Pierce
Mfg. Co., id. at 4170; Johnstown Traction Co., (1932) at 135 id. at 1490; Lukens Steel Co.,
id. at 3702; 4175 Witherbe Sherman Co., id. at 4175; Booth Fisheries Co. Del., (1933) 136
id. at 2977; Manville Jenckes Co., id. at 2984; Cairo Bridge & Terminal Co., id. at 3549;
Globe Wernecke Co., (1934) 139 id. at 1403; two rival plans for Wayne Pump Co., Id.




the arguments defending as fair and equitable the practice of preserving
in modified form the old sequence of claims. The appeal of this ven-
erable institution, especially in times of depression, may be strong enough
to offset the Supreme Court's insistence upon the sanctity of creditors'
rights. In case the decline in earnings which is responsible for the
corporation's present inability to meet the claims of creditors should
prove but temporary, there are obvious objections to allowing a forfeiture
of the equity interest to enrich the senior creditors. Delay may reveal
earnings adequate to satisfy the senior claims and leave a surplus. The
delay incident to the equity receivership or bankruptcy procedure
amounts to a moratorium of somewhat indefinite duration. Perhaps the
Supreme Court precedents do not condemn a strict moratorium, if recog-
nized as an emergency remedy and limited in scope. 0 It might therefore
be inquired why it would not be advantageous to substitute a moratorium
precisely defined in the reorganization plan and thus relieve the court
of supervisory burdens.
The answer is that a mere moratorium would not serve the reorgan-
izer's needs. For a reorganization plan to involve a moratorium and
nothing more it may be necessary to fix a definite time limit to the period
for preserving the junior equity. Unless the senior claim in default is
paid off within this period it should be entitled to hold the property
unfettered by any possibility of redemption. The senior claim and any
arrears of interest must be paid off in full, in cash or new securities
voluntarily accepted in lieu of cash, before any payment on account of
principal or interest to the junior claimants. Then the next ranking
claim must be paid and so on. Pending payment of the senior claim,
its holders should be able to get partial satisfaction out of all income
yielded by the property. Meanwhile there should be adequate repre-
sentation of the creditor interests in the administration of the property.o
39. See Feller, Moratorium (1933) 10 ENcYc. Soc. Scza cEs 649, discusS-ng the somewhat
analogous problem of the constitutionality, under the contract and due proce s clauzes,
of state statutes providing moratoriums for individual debtors. There are of course in-
stances where a mere extension of maturity as to principal is all the relief the corporate
debtor requests, and where a majority of creditors will agree to this. See plan for Glen
L. Martin Company of Baltimore reported as confirmed by the district judge Dec. 7, 1934,
(1935) 1 COROATE REORGANZATIONS 218. Where the plan "funds" several years' coupo=a
into preferred stock, meanwhile leaving the debtor in complete control, and offers no as-ur-
ance that the creditors' strategic position will be in any way improved at the end of such
period, the modification of the creditors' rights may be as substantial as under any other
form of reorganization; see Allegheny Corporation Plan, summarized in (1934) 133 Co -r-
& FIN. CnoN. 1911. See (1935) 140 id. at 1647 (refers to ruling of C. C. A. 4th, confirming
plan as fair).
40. So far as voting control is concerned, it need not make any difference whether
what the old stockholders get is called a stock, limited as to dividend participation until
the old creditors' claims have been paid off, or called an option privilege to obtain stoc:
by redeeming the equity from the prior claimants. By use of a voting trust, the reorgani-
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If the moratorium is worked out by giving income bonds or preferred
stock, the entire income should be devoted to thus paying off each claim
in order of priority. If the modern device of option warrants is used
as the vehicle for the preservation of a junior equity the option, must
be on the entire equity interest in the reorganized company and the
option price high enough so that if exercised by the entire group of option
holders, it would furnish enough cash to retire the claims senior to it;
and the proceeds should be so applied. A complex series of options
could be used to extend pro rata to junior claimants successive rights
of redemption comparable to the privileges accorded in some states to
the mortgagor and junior lien holders upon foreclosure of an ordinary
real estate mortgage. 1
Such a moratorium type of plan is quite unlike the conventional re-
organization patterns42 and is subject to insuperable practical objections.
zers may arrange any desired allocation of control. However, the conceptual difference
may have an important procedural consequence bearing upon the chances of obtaining
rigid adherence to whatever time limit is set for the duration of the moratorium. The
option expires by its own terms, and the option holders would have an uphill fight to ob-
tain protection for any alleged equity after the expiration date. If, however, creditors'
interests are represented by income bonds, then foreclosure of the new income bonds may
prove as difficult as it was to obtain strict enforcement of the conditions of the old secu-
rities. For a plan which ignored this difficulty see Chicago & West Towns Ry, Plan,
dated Sept. 23, 1932, (1932) 135 Coxrx. & Fmn. CmaoN. 2652. For an attempt to cope with
this difficulty see the Fashion Trades Building Plan, (1932) 134 Comm. & Fm. CinoN, 4667
(old bondholders received new 5% income bonds and 25% of the stock. The balance of
the stock was placed in escrow and to be cancelled if less than 3% interest should be paid
on the bonds.) Dierks Lumber Co. Plan, (1932) 135 id. at 3697.
The novelty of the stock warrant gives it an advantage over other complicated contingent
devices for working out a settlement in such a way as to dull the realization by security-
holders of the sacrifices imposed on them by a plan. It might be employed to snatch more
from bondholders than they realize they are conceding. In cases where bondholders are
dominating the plan, it is more likely to be used as a gentle way of easing the stockholders
out of the picture.
41. Reference to the use of stock warrants in the plans announced during the last few
years indicates no attempt to extend to junior equities a pro rata right of redemption.
If exercised the proceeds are to be available for general corporate purposes; the proceeds
will usually amount to much less than the aggregate of the old claims ahead of those to
whom the warrants are offered; and exercise of the options will involve acquisition of only
a minority interest in the new corporation. In part at least, the old bondholders or gen-
eral creditors are abandoning their right to be paid ahead of the old stockholders and re-
ceiving in return a part of the equity interest in the new corporation. The junior interests
in lieu of the right to all of the equity after certain claims are paid, are to receive a frac-
tion of the surplus after a reduced amount of prior charges have been satisfied. For ex-
amples see the following plans in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle: Appalachian
Gas Corp., Oct. 25, 1932, (1932) 135 Comm. & Fix. CHnOx€. 3519; Republic Gas Corp.,
id. at 3692; General Water Works & Electric Corp., id. at 2173; Allegheny Gas Corp., (1933)
136 id. at 657; American Service Co., (1934) 139 id. at 750. See also National Radiator Co.
plan, infra page 955.
42. Cf. Plan of Dec. 15, 1932 for Ohio Terminal Co., (1932) 135 Comm. & Fmr. CHRoN.
4394. Old bondholders received new income bonds of which one hall were to be retired
before any payment on stock given to old preferred and common stockholders.
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The resultant financial structure of the reorganized company would
embarrass future management and finance, and thus tend to impede that
salvage of earning capacity which is the principal justification for re-
organization. In this respect the plan would be regarded as unsatis-
factory by all security holders. More immediately it would fail to dis-
tribute sacrifices in accordance with the relative bargaining power of
those whose assents are necessary. The plan would founder on the
stubborn fact of human greed.
Just what determines relative bargaining power is an elusive matter
of speculation. One thing seems certain, however: de facto bargaining
power can have very little relation to the de jure hierarchy of priorities.
Suppose we are concerned with one class of mortgage bondholders, one
of junior creditors and one class of stock, that there is about the same
face value to each group, and that current earnings are less than the
interest upon the bonds. It may be that the mortgage bondholders are
so well organized and so stubborn, and so confident of being able to get
prompt possession if forced to foreclose against the opposition of the
junior claimants, that they would be able to compel all junior interests
to agree to full preservation of their own right to prior payment of both
principal and interest. But this assumption would imply a weak bar-
gaining position for creditors junior to them. It would be most unlikely
that the junior creditors would also be in a position to insist upon one
hundred per cent preservation of their right to priority over stockholders.
But for their equitable right to clog the settlement between bondholders
and stockholders, they would usually be in a less advantageous position
than stockholders to obstruct the bondholders and therefore in a weaker
bargaining position. The only benefit to junior creditors as a class from
the Supreme Court's requirement that their priority be preserved as a
condition to appeasing stockholders, is to give them equality of bargain-
ing power with the stock, plus whatever psychological advantage there
may be in entering negotiations with a principle to fight for.
An oversimplified illustration may clarify the relationship between
bargaining power and theoretical rights of priority. Suppose there is
only a single junior creditor and a single stockholder. Each will realize
that there is a limit to the amount which the mortgage bondholders will
concede to obviate resistance to realization upon their security, that each
is about equally likely to be wiped out if a stalemate develops and
results ultimately in strict foreclosure, and that each has about the same
chance of causing a stalemate. On what basis shall they divide the
aggregate that may be snatched from the bondholders? If the creditor
is moved by avarice alone, it would be to his advantage to take 10%
and leave 90% to the stockholder, unless he could persuade the stock-
holder to offer something better. It would be equally to the stockholder's
advantage to take 10% and leave 90% to the creditor, in case he felt
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that the creditor was so fanatically stubborn as to be willing to sacri-
fice everything rather than take less than 90%o.
The process of settlement involves attempts upon each side to impress
the other side with its own stubbornness, to the limit possible without
provoking greater stubbornness upon the other side. The air is full of
ethical principles for which each side is ready to die. It is also full of
protestations of desire to be fair. Each side is maneuvering for the
advantage of being the dog who is defending his own bone, not trying
to snatch the other's away. Any strict insistence by the creditor upon
his right to priority involves his taking the extreme position of wanting
for himself one hundred percent of what is available for division. It
is not, therefore, a principle which can be advanced as a basis of com-
promise. It can be matched with the ethical idea of avoiding forfeiture,
upon which both junior creditor and stockholder are relying in their
common struggle with the mortgage bondholders. A much more powerful
and relevant ethical symbol to invoke is that of equality. But the idea
of equality may be applied in a great variety of ways. The individual
who happens to be the creditor and the individual who happens to be
the stockholder may each take the same aggregate amount; or each may
take the same percentage of some common denominator. Here in turn
is further opportunity for competing theories. The common denominator
may be the face value of the claim; the book value; the amount of
capitAl contribution to the business which gave rise to the claim; what
the particular holder paid for it; quotations and valuations put upon
the claim by others at various possible times. Either claim may be scaled
down with a view to squeezing out water or to prevent one holder from
taking too much quick profit from a recent purchase, where the other
is forced to take a loss with reference to original cost at some remoter
period.4" Thus in the course of negotiation the principle of respect for
promised priorities is swallowed in a moral fog.
The lack of any one definite and controlling ethical principle enhances
the significance of the other factors in the bargaining process: the
known extrinsic pressures which make one party more likely to give
43. For the argumentative purpose of minimizing the extent to which a plan disregards
creditors' rights of priority, comparison is frequently made between the face value of
creditors' claims and par value of stock. If it happens that the creditor has actually, con-
tributed some value to the business, and that the stock represents nothing but promoters'
expectations of earning capacity which did not materialize, the basis of comparison la
absurd. If we consider the modem no par and nominal par stocks it breaks down alto-
gether. In case of $1 par stock which actually represented much more both in actual In-
vestment and in quotations at about the time of the reorganization it may be that stock-
holders are in a strong enough bargaining position to insist upon much more per par value
of their stock than creditors can get per face value of their claims. The argument also
overlooks the basis upon which credit is usually solicited; namely, reference to the claims




way than the other, and the personalities, whether timid or aggressive,
of the negotiants. Matters of personality and pressure of collateral
interests assume even larger importance when we turn from our simple
illustration to the complex actualities of reorganization negotiations be-
tween committees representing large groups of security holders. Then
is involved the personalities, interests and loyalties not only of the com-
mittee members but of the diverse constituents for whom each committee
assumes to act. A committee's power is very largely affected by the
degree of assurance with which it can count upon support from security
holders. If its constituents must be cajoled with specious inducements,
if it matters to them whether what they get is called a bond or a stock,
or what is its nominal face value, or whether they or others put up
new money, without regard to the consideration given for it, then the
committee must sacrifice more substantial advantages to gain points of
only illusory importance. With the multitude of immediate practical
pressures tending to shape the plan, the tendency is to treat the legal
requirement to respect priorities, as a minor technical detail-something
for the lawyers to fix up-rather than a rigid mold to which the business
aspects of the plan must conform.
Suppose however that the nonethical factors bearing upon the nego-
tiations happen to be evenly balanced, and that the conflicting ethical
principles, usually invoked by the contending groups, should give way
to an authoritative judicial pronouncement as to what is equitable, and
that this should point to a strict moratorium. There would still be
powerful practical objections from the point of view of safety in future
management and financing. Since the postponed claims of bondholders
and other senior creditors would continue to threaten the extinction of
the stockholders' equity, new capital, even for legitimate expansion, could
not be obtained by sale of stock, but only by sale of bonds. This would
mean piling up fixed charges as long as an upturn of the business cycle
would make it possible to sell them; then would follow default on the
new bonds, and reorganization, with the next depression. Moreover the
remoteness of the chance that the old debts would be paid or refunded
within the moratorium period would present in the most exaggerated
possible form that conflict in interest as to managerial policies, present
to some extent in even simple and conservative capital structures. A
management which really protected the senior claimants would have to
be so conservative that holders of the junior equities would not feel
that they were receiving a proper chance of retrieving themselves. What-
ever pressure they might exercise either by direct voting or by intangible
influence upon voting trustees would prompt the management to put
to speculative uses not only the working capital made available by the
plan but whatever is obtainable from future borrowings.
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Even the limited and somewhat illusory preservation of the old priority
hierarchies which has been typical of railroad reorganizations has been
enough to develop these dangerous tendencies. This has been a fre-
quent theme of those who have criticized the conduct of reorganizations."
The mild flavor of moratorium incident to the typical reorganization
plan commends itself to the practical reorganizer because it helps to
satisfy the many people who must be brought together. He is likely
to agree with his critics that the resultant financial structure is any-
thing but ideal. However, he will attribute its shortcomings to the
perversity of the human emotions he must satisfy rather than to his
own iniquity or shortsightedness. The reorganizer's self-interest in
maintaining his own prestige gives him some motive to work for a sound
financial structure. But this may be subordinated to his immediate need
of obtaining maximum support for his plan. If he scorns to defer to
the weaknesses and illusions of the security holders, his opponents may
be counted on to make the appeal to prejudice. Nevertheless, there
are some limits to the extent that security holders will desire, or re-
organizers permit, the plan to be shaped by reference to past hopes
rather than present prospects. Both would prefer to allow the old stock-
holders a reduced participation in a new stock interest that would carry
some expectation of dividends, rather than to conform to the idea of
a moratorium and give them the entire amount of an equity with so
much ahead of it that there would be constant pressure for reckless
management.45
Anticipatory Reorganization
Assuming that the law forbids compelling creditors of an insolvent
corporation to accept a contingent obligation as a substitute for their
right to exhaust all of the debtor's assets and that a moratorium is un-
workable, what if insolvency itself is contingent at the time a plan is
proposed? When ultimate insolvency is threatened but not certain,
44. See Max Lowenthal, The Case of the Missouri Pacific (Dec. 1934) HIAnPER'S MAOA-
znrz 86. For criticisms by the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Missourl-Kansas Texas
Reorganization (Dissenting opinion of Commissioner Eastman), 76 I. C. C. 84, 108 (1922);
Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, 131 I. C. C. 673 (1928).
49. "Bondholders, debenture holders and prior preference stockholders have a real,
although intangible, interest in seeing that the corporation has a preferred and common
stock structure which is appropriate to the earnings, assets and financing requirements of
the enterprise." Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations under Sec-
tion 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 CoL. L. REg. 571, 578. Cf. note 37, supra, for
an example of what may happen if this consideration is ignored, The voting trust which
typically accompanies reorganizations is justified as a protection against giving control to
stock which has so little present value. The protection is likely to be inadequate, however,
either because of the short duration of the trust, or because there is too much pre Mure




reorganization may be proposed as a preventive rather than a cure.
Such an anticipatory reorganization was attempted for the National
Radiator Corporation in 1931.46
The corporation was still indubitably "solvent" in the sense of being
able to meet all presently maturing obligations. It was in a very strong
current asset position, but allegedly owing to the depression in the build-
ing industry, it was suffering large losses after interest and sinking fund
obligations on its funded debt. The funded debt was represented by a
single issue of debenture bonds, followed by preferred and common stock.
The plan involved paying off short-term creditors, exchanging the old
bonds for 50% in income bonds, 507 in preferred stock and common
stock sufficient to give the bondholders as a class control of the reorgan-
ized company. Old preferred stockholders were to receive some common
stock without assessment. Old common stockholders paid a nominal
assessment for option warrants.
The plan was supported by a somewhat complicated hypothesis: that
earnings were unlikely to improve before the present surplus of work-
ing capital had been paid out; that an ultimate revival of the building
industry and consequent development of earning capacity for the busi-
ness was probable; that if the revival came, the present amount of
working capital would be needed to take advantage of it; that, therefore
to postpone reorganization until the corporation was obliged to default
would only mean the added burden of raising new money equivalent to
what had meanwhile been paid out to bondholders, and no small burden
it would be in case the then demoralization of the security markets should
continue. Hence it was claimed to be in the bondholders' interest to
substitute a generous claim on ultimate earnings for their smaller if
more certain opportunity to realize upon the liquid assets.
Assuming anticipatory reorganizations are to be permitted at all, no
one can question the fairness of stockholders receiving some participa-
tion. In fact it would seem a fraud upon stockholders for the manage-
ment to engineer a gratuitous surrender to creditors so long as there is
a speculative hope of being able to meet obligations as they mature
and as a result of improved conditions, earn a surplus for stockholders.
Nevertheless the value of the stockholders' equity is not measurable
either absolutely or in terms of the new security which may be tendered
them. In passing upon a particular plan it would be impossible to
say how far the participation offered stockholders represents a return
for surrendering control during the period that stockholders are entitled
to retain it and how far it takes account of the fact that even if re-
organization were postponed until actual insolvency, the stockholders
46. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flerhem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934). See Sargnt
and Zelkowich, Reorganization of "Solvent" Corporations (1934) 29 Ix.. L. P=. 137.
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would be in a position to demand something. Moreover, the anticipatory
type of reorganization would lend itself admirably to giving value to
promoters' watered stock by scaling down prior claims. Thus whether
or not the National Radiator Corporation plan appeared likely to improve
the caliber of the bondholders' investment, and whether or not it was
fair as between its stockholders and bondholders, it was inherently vicious
from the punitive point of view. The new technique pointed to an easy
evasion of all the Supreme Court precedents. The proponents received
full co-operation from the receivership judge, and approval of the result
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but their method was condemned by
the Supreme Court.48
The attack was focused on the procedure rather than on the plan.
Ninety-five per cent of the bonds having been deposited in support of
the plan, a fight developed with dissenters over the right to use the
coercive powers of this majority to compel unanimous acceptance. One
group of dissenters succeeded in getting paid in full, despite their failure
to rebut insinuations that their bonds were purchased at a discount for
the purpose of attacking the plan.47  The nature of thd reorganization
plan was such that the burden of the recovery by dissenters fell imme-
diately upon the assenting bondholders although it incidentally lessened
the value of the speculative equity retained by the old stockholders.
The corporation had failed to pay interest on its bonds whether or
not their holders had assented to the plan. After a suit by unpaid
dissenters to collect interest, a consent receivership was obtained, the
trustee was induced to declare the maturity accelerated, to obtain judg-
ment for the entire issue, and to intervene. Ultimately there was a
sale, and the property was acquired by the reorganization committee.
The distributive share for nondepositors was so low as to make it prac-
tically compulsory to come in, due, according to the Supreme Court
opinion, "to the mistaken belief that it was the duty of the court to
aid in effectuating the Plan of Reorganization. 48  In reversing the de-
cision the Supreme Court held that such appellants as had objected to
the lack of equity jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for a still "solvent"
corporation were entitled to be paid in full.
47. Transcript of Record fol. 594-596. Intervening petitioner Amy Arzt was an office
employee of counsel. Seventy-one bonds had been assigned to her "for the purpose of
consolidating various claims of people interested in those bonds very recently." The
assignor was a corporation called "Bondholders' Syndicate of America." Who the actual
beneficial owners were, counsel could not state. Later request was made, "We believe that
it is only proper to ask the Court to direct Mr. Palley to file in court here, when he has
the necessary information, a statement as to who owns the bonds . . . and the dates when
those bonds were acquired by the beneficial owners of them." There was no ruling made
on this request (fol. 639).
48. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 5S (1934).
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Reorganization in the Twilight Zone Between Equitable and
Bankruptcy Insolvency
The new reorganization amendments to the Bankruptcy Act expressly
continue the requirement of insolvency in the equity sense as a pre-
requisite to proceedings under them. But the extent to which manipu-
lation may arrange a situation where default appears to be compulsory,
and the rather perfunctory hearing provided as to the good faith of
the petitioning debtor, suggest doubt as to how far the limitation Will
be observed in practice.49 Moreover Sections 77 and 77B suggest a
modified idea of anticipatory reorganization-reorganization of corpor-
ations which, though unable to meet their debts as they mature, are not
shown to be insolvent according to the definition in Section 1 (15)
of the Bankruptcy Act.50 Unless the debtor is found to be thus in-
solvent there must be adequate protection for the realization by stock-
holders of the value of their equity in the property of the debtor dealt
with by the planP
The inference from the text that bondholders who do not make their
peace with the stockholders will have the burden of proving insolvency,
the difficulties of proving insolvency as a prerequisite to obtaining an
adjudication of bankruptcy upon an involuntary petitionr - the inherent
uncertainties of new legislation until authoritatively construed, the con-
temporary pressure for relief of the debtor classes, and the new economic
philosophies with their emphasis on the desirability of wider distribu-
tion of purchasing power at the expense of vested rights, all contribute
to giving stockholders a bargaining power even beyond what they enjoyed
in the old equity reorganizations. Reorganizers are thus more than ever
compelled to gain their support.
Moreover, it is not possible at the present time to win their support
by an offering conditioned upon payment of an assessment-the one
49. The court is logically obliged to assume such insolvency for all the purposes of the
proceeding including appraisal of the fairness of the plan. This prevents the surrender
of control from being treated as a new consideration moving from those interested in the
stock, making it fair to allow them some participation before creditors are satisfied. The
business appraisal of what is fair is likely to involve the contrary assumption, that the
management could have continued to meet maturing obligations for some time, and that
its co-operation in timing the filing of its petition in conformity with the plans of those who
wish to reorganize, makes it only fair that something should be done for stockholders.
50. § 1 (15) provides "a person shall be deemed insolvent ... whenever the aggregate of
his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed ...with intent to
defraud.. . shall not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." Both
§ 77 (a) and § 77B (a) require the initiating petition to state that the debtor is "insolvent
or unable to meet its debts as they mature."
51. § 77 (b) (4); § 77B (b) (4).
32. Bonbright and Pickett, Valuation to Determine Solvency Under the Bankruptcy Act
(1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 582. Wehle, Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 of Itz
Bankruptcy Act (1934) 44 YAX.E L. J. 197, 217.
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sure way, according to the equity precedents, of thwarting attack by
dissenters. 3 The new procedure has accentuated the other factors preva-
lent since the depression which make assessments undesirable. The
abolition of the requirement of offering dissenters a cash alternative, the
elimination of ancillary receiverships and of the necessity of a sale and
organization of a new corporation, together with the tendency to begin
reorganization proceedings before cash and quick assets are exhausted,
may dispense with any necessity for raising cash by the plan. 4 Even
where cash is needed, the present unwillingness of stockholders to pay
assessments, and the availability of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, will frequently make it undesirable to obtain any new consideration
as a justification for the participation offered to stockholders. The
justification must be found in the assumption that insolvency has not
been established and that therefore preservation of their equity is re-
quired.
The assumption of solvency, however, will make it difficult to accom-
plish the desired scaling down of creditors' claims. Both reorganization
acts enjoin the preservation of the equity, if any, of junior creditors
in language substantially identical with that applicable to stockholders."
While it is possible to bind an entire class of creditors to terms accepted
by two-thirds in amount, this is only in case the plan is found to be
"fair and equitable." 6  Objecting junior creditors may point to the
assumption of solvency as indicating one hundred per cent equity for
them, no matter how trivial the participation offered to stockholders.
Dissenting bondholders may use the same argument in case anything
is offered to junior creditors, and use it even more persuasively in case
equities of both junior creditors and stockholders are recognized. They
will insist that the standard of fairness under the amendments to the
bankruptcy act, must be that hitherto laid down by the Supreme Court
as applicable to equity reorganizations.
The finding of solvency in the bankruptcy sense, in lieu of the con-
ventional assumption in equity reorganizations that the property is worth
less than the amount of the mortgage in foreclosure, does not weaken
the position of dissenters and junior creditors. It might perhaps be
treated realistically as having no relation to facts, and merely a con-
clusion of law: just a complicated, legalistic way of saying that the
court is willing to lend its aid to those who want to reorganize. If so,
then there is an exact parallel to the situation assumed in the old equity
reorganizations. If, however, the finding of solvency is treated as a
53. A future article will show the complete breakdown of the attempt made in the Boyd
case to apply the principles of the Howard case to this type of reorganization.
54. See Weiner, supra note 1, at 1191.
55. § 77 (b) (5); § 77B (5).
56. § 77 (f) (1); § 77B (f) (1).
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finding of fact entitled to be respected by appellate courts, it still leaves
the dissenters and objecting junior creditors in a strong position. If
the principles of equity entitled them to insist upon one hundred per
cent satisfaction in case stockholders received anything, even where the
property was valued below the amount of the mortgage in default, can
it be equitable that they should receive less satisfaction from a solvent
corporation?
Of course the most perfect logical attack on a plan may be matched
by equally perfect logic in its support, depending on the premises select-
ed. Proponents of the plan may use over again all of the old arguments
and fictions which have in the past served them so well before receiver-
ship judges. In addition, they may point to the impetus for the legis-
lation in the economic emergency and the desirability of expediting the
reorganization of the multitude of corporations now in financial diffi-
culties, as requiring courts to approve plans that conform to common
sense business standards of fairness rather than artificial legal ones.
The choice of formal premises or of inarticulate assumptions throws
us back to the struggle between practical and punitive ideals.
Today, as in the past, it is the practical ideal which is likely to
dominate the reorganization judge. He is likely to feel as much pressure
as heretofore to get reorganization done, and be as impatient as ever
with those who insist for themselves upon terms which it is not practical
to obtain for their entire class. Once a plan has received the statu-
tory percentage of assents, the further requirement that it be found
fair and equitable will appear to him as tautological. His approval
of the plan will be a useful weapon to persuade dissatisfied but
timorous bondholders to deposit, and will be of some help in settling
with even the more predatory opposition. The opposition will be
strengthened by the fact that they are invoking a clear-cut logical
objection to the plan which does not involve appellate court inquiry
into matters of fact. On the other hand, they must weigh the delays
of appeal, the amount of capital which must meanwhile be tied up, the
chance that the Circuit Court of Appeals may reflect the practical atti-
tude of the reorganization judge, that the Supreme Court may deny
certiorari or even depart from its historical insistence upon the preserva-
tion of the prior rights of creditors.
Where bondholders in a position of marginal security take a dominant
part in shaping the reorganization plan, they may decide that there is
less to be lost by allowing dissenters or a small number of junior creditors
one hundred per cent recovery than by encountering the united oppo-
sition of the stockholders. Where the plan is engineered by stockholders
who attempt to enlist the support of bondholders not independently
represented, the stockholders may so arrange it that the consenting
bondholders rather than the stockholders bear the impact of whatever
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toll must be paid to dissenters. This indicates a probability that a great
many reorganizations will be successfully accomplished which secure
the subordinate rights of stockholders at the expense of the prior rights
of creditors before the Supreme Court shall have had occasion to pass
upon their validity under the amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. For
the purpose of accomplishing most of the pending reorganizations the
important question is not what the Court will decide but what potential
dissenters can now be made to think it will decide.
If the Court should hold that no reorganization plan is "fair and
equitable" under the new legislation which amounts to a fraudulent con-
veyance within the equity precedents, then reorganizations subsequent
to such a decision will have to be accomplished by finding some other
excuse for the inevitable concession to stockholders. Perhaps by this
time, it will be less inconvenient than now to resort to an assessment.
It will be pointed out in a future article how this device, which has
usually been necessary to raise cash, incidentally offered the royal road
to evasion of the taboos against forcing creditors to compromise with
stockholders. This will be offered as further proof that however vital
it may be to a capitalistic society to uphold the sanctity of contracts,
those who champion the punitive ideal for reorganization are engaged
in a futile struggle. Once this fact is accepted, it leads to inquiry
whether emphasis should not be shifted from control over reorganization
to control over the financial processes which lead to it. Since every
reorganization plan is itself a launching of a new financial structure
to carry the expectations of investors, there should be less concern over
the practical impossibility of reconciling the old inconsistent expectations,
and more caution as to the adequacy of the foundation for the new hopes.
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